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Abstract
The observation has been made that the climate change issue broke onto the international
policy making agenda in the mid 1980s, between 1985 and 1988.  The issue moved from
the realm of science to the realm of politics. As such, this period provides fertile ground
for exploration of the relationship between science, knowledge, and action on
international environmental issues. This relationship is the emphasis of this study, as it
provides an account of the transition of climate change to the international policy agenda.
This study explores the often made claim that it was the development of a scientific
consensus, a reframing of the climate debate, and attention from an international group of
scientists that pushed the issue into the international political spotlight by the late 1980s.
The Villach 1985 conference is often cited as the source for these claims.  This study
contends that the 1985 Villach conference did not represent a significant change in
scientific conclusions about the problems of climate change.  Rather, a new emphasis on
certain scientific facts, the unique quality of the international group of scientists, and new
perceptions of the opportunity for action on international environmental problems led the
Villach group to reach a new set of political and policy conclusions which emphasized
the urgency of action.  Several policy and science entrepreneurs advocated action to
address problems of global environmental change.  Their conclusions coincided with a
number of other developments, including extreme weather in the United States and the
successful negotiation of an international agreement to protect the ozone layer, which
pressed in the direction of further international attention to environmental problems.  By
1988, a variety of international players were involved in shaping the debate about
responses to climate change.
Citation, Context and Reproduction
This paper may be cited as: Wendy E. Franz. “The Development of an International
Agenda for Climate Change:  Connecting Science to Policy." ENRP Discussion Paper E-
97-07, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, August 1997 and also as
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Interim Report IR-97-034/August.
This document appears as ENRP Discussion Paper E-97-07 of the Environment and
Natural Resources Program (ENRP), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
(BCSIA). ENRP Discussion papers are works in progress. This paper may be reproduced
for personal and classroom use.  Any other reproduction is not permitted without written
permission. Comments are welcome and may be directed to the author in care of  Nancy
Dickson, GEA Project Associate Director, BCSIA, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA   02138, telephone (617) 496-9469,
telefax (617) 495-8963, Email nancy_dickson@harvard.edu. The views expressed in this
paper are those of the author and publication does not imply their endorsement by BCSIA
and Harvard University.
The Global Environmental Assessment (GEA) project is a collaborative team study of
global environmental assessment as a link between science and policy.  The Team is
based at Harvard University, but includes substantial contributions from the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria, Cornell University, Duke
University and the Center for Integrated Study of the Human Dimensions of Global
Change at Carnegie Mellon University.  The project has two principal objectives.  The
first is to develop a more realistic and synoptic model of the actual relationships among
science, assessment, and management in social responses to global change, and to use
that model to understand, critique, and improve current practice of assessment as a bridge
between science and policy making.  The second  is to elucidate a strategy of adaptive
assessment and policy for global environmental problems, along with the methods and
institutions to implement such a strategy in the real world.
The GEA Project is supported by a core grant from the National Science Foundation
(Award No. SBR-9521910)  for the "Global Environmental Assessment Team.”
Additional support is provided by the Department of Energy (Award No. DE-FG02-
95ER62122) for the project  "Assessment Strategies for Global Environmental Change,"
the National Institute for Global Environmental Change Great Plains Office (Award No.
LWT 62-123-06518) for the project "Towards Useful Integrated Assessments:  A
Bottom-up Approach,” the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the Center for Integrated Study
of the Human Dimensions of Global Change at Carnegie Mellon University.
Publication abstracts of the GEA Project can be found on the GEA Web Page at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/enrp/gea.  Further information on the Global
Environmental Assessment project can be obtained from the Project Associate Director,
Nancy Dickson, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, telephone (617)
496-9469, telefax (617) 495-8963, Email nancy_dickson@harvard.edu
 1997 by Wendy E. Franz.  All rights reserved.
Acronym List
AES Atmospheric Environment Service (Canada)
AGGG Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases
CAN Climate Action Network
ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions
INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NRC National Research Council
SCOPE Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WRI World Resources Institute
The Development of an International
Agenda for Climate Change:
Connecting Science to Policy
Wendy E. Franz
Introduction
i
The observation has been made that the climate change issue broke onto the international
policy making agenda in the mid 1980s, between 1985 and 1988. The Toronto
Conference of 1988 represented a major policy declaration on global warming, calling for
a 20% reduction in global CO2 emissions by the year 2005. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 (though proposals for it were
circulating as early as 1987), and in 1989 a high level ministerial conference was held in
Noordwijk, Netherlands, as intergovernmental science and policy discussions began in
earnest. The 1989 Group of Seven Economic Summit in Paris featured environmental
issues. At the same time, a group of international non-governmental organizations formed
the Climate Action Network (CAN) for improved communication on the climate issue.
By 1990, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) had received its charge
from the UN General Assembly, and the committee began to meet in early 1991. An
issue that had been the domain of climatologists, oceanographers, and scientific
bureaucracies moved rapidly into the domain of international policy analysts, the public,
environment ministers, presidents and prime ministers. As one observer noted “[a]ll of
the sudden [climate change] was on the [political] agenda”.
As such, this period provides fertile ground for exploration of the relationship between
science, knowledge, and action on international environmental issues. This relationship is
the particular emphasis of this study, as it provides an account of the transition of climate
change to the international policy agenda.
Connecting Science to Policy in Climate Change
There are many ways in which science may intersect with knowledge and action.
Spectacular scientific findings may spawn a series of congressional hearings or greater
2public attention to a particular issue, science advisory panels may consult with national or
international decision makers, or scientists may be consulted on an ad hoc basis as
circumstances warrant. Scientific knowledge may also be organized, evaluated,
integrated, and presented in documents intended to focus and coalesce action for further
scientific research or policy action.ii This latter form of the science / action linkage is, in
general, known as a scientific assessment. It is with this form of the linkage that this
study will be concerned.
Most accounts of the transition of the climate change issue from the international science
agenda to the international policy agenda make note of the importance of several
international assessments and conferences. The series of international assessments
organized and carried out by the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) in the 1980s have generally merited special attention. In particular,
the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and of
Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts at Villach,
Austria in October 1985 (based upon a report issued by the Scientific Committee on
Problems of the Environment and eventually published as a World Climate Programme
report), and workshops held in Villach, Austria, and Bellagio, Italy in 1987 have been
identified as contributors to the development of the international agenda on climate
change. In general however, accounts of the development of the international policy
agenda emphasize that these events roughly coincide with the burst of international
interest in climate change, making minimal claims about the reasons for attributing
importance to these assessments. Such accounts, while many provide excellent accounts
of the history of the climate change issue, rarely reach any conclusions about the ways, if
any, in which these assessments bore on the policy making process (see for example,
Bodansky, 1992; the Social Learning Group, 1998; Hecht and Tirpak, 1995; Pomerance,
1989; Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994a, 1994b).
In contrast, this study explores the direct links between scientific assessments and the
development of international policy initiatives. It asks the following general questions.
Did these assessments appear to have informed the agenda setting process if so, how?
Were there other contextual events that have shaped not only the intersection of
knowledge and policy, but led states to take an interest in climate change at the
international level? In particular, this study asks how accurate is the perception that the
series of international assessments organized and carried out by ICSU, WMO, and
UNEP, were critical to the connections drawn between scientific knowledge and policy?
Did these assessments say something new, or did they say something differently? If yes,
why? Were these assessments advocated (or criticized) by particular groups? How were
the messages of these assessments carried, translated, or transmitted by the assessors or
other observers? What influence did the hot summer of 1988 and the ongoing
negotiations on the ozone issue have on the process of connecting climate science to
climate action?
Several conjectures about the forces which shape the connection between knowledge and
policy can be drawn from international relations theory, writings on the role of science in
3policy making, and from several specific accounts of this period of time. Several
treatments of science and international relations have emphasized that scientific
consensus is often a crucial factor in catalyzing international agreement. This study will
evaluate the science as it is presented in the international assessments series and the
extent to which these assessments reached new or different scientific conclusions. In
addition, the extent to which the different framings of a problem result in different arrays
of interests and actions will also be explored. In the case of climate change, much has
been made of a change in the definition of the climate change problem from one of
carbon dioxide and energy, to one of carbon dioxide plus other greenhouse gases. Other
international relations theorists have emphasized the importance of the constellation of
interests and international institutions. In this respect, the backdrop of international
politics, including the status of other environmental agreements, will be considered, in
addition to the role that the UNEP, ICSU, and the WMO played in catalyzing action.
Studies of agenda setting in American politics suggest that the role of chance events
cannot be underestimated. In this case, the hot summer of 1988 in the United States is an
important consideration. This study, as a contribution to the endeavor of understanding
the role of scientific assessments in managing global environmental risks, will also seek
to mine the historical record of the international series of assessments for new lessons.
This study will contend that the 1985 Villach process did not represent a significant
change in scientific conclusions about the problems of climate change. Rather, a new
emphasis on certain scientific facts, the unique quality of the international group of
scientists, and new perceptions of the opportunity for action on international
environmental problems led the Villach group to reach a new set of political and policy
conclusions which emphasized the urgency of action. These conclusions coincided with a
number of other developments which pressed in the direction of further international
attention to environmental problems, and the Villach findings were used to reinforce the
case of others interested in action to address the problems of global climatic change. The
reasons for the use of Villach findings had less to do with the new emphasis on scientific
facts, and more to do with the advocacy of the findings by some participants in a variety
of fora and the utility of using the conclusions reached by an international group. It is
important to recognize that some of the factors which influenced the nature of the Villach
conclusions may also have shaped the state of the climate change issue on the
international agenda. As such, the assessments themselves may be intervening variables.
In the ultimate analysis, the shape of the debate in the late 1980s about responses to
climate change bore little resemblance to the conclusions that were reached at Villach,
although a push by the group to formulate policy relevant targets and timetables was
continued.
The Agenda
The phrase “climate change was on the international agenda” merits a close examination.
What is meant by it? How can this claim be evaluated? Who are the relevant actors?
Studies of domestic public policy making have used a variety of common sense
4indicators for the presence of an issue on the agenda. John Kingdon’s oft cited book on
domestic agenda setting notes that an issue is on the agenda if government actors
(administration officials, civil servants, and legislators) and actors outside government
closely associated with government actors (interest groups, academics, the media) are
paying serious attention to it. Other studies have adopted similar arenas of focus,
exploring congressional records and the level of media attention to identify issues that are
on the agenda (see for example, Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; the Social Learning
Group, 1998).
For purposes of the study at hand, the international agenda differs in some significant
ways from the domestic agenda, and actors specific to environmental issues can be
identified. The next several paragraphs delineate the way in which this study conceives of
“the international agenda”.
In the case of an issue with significant scientific and technical components like climate
change, it is reasonable expect that the issue may be one that is on the agenda of
scientists. In the international arena, groups of scientists from around the world may be
engaged in forging common research plans, holding conferences, or conducting scientific
assessments. For example, in the case of arms control, groups of scientists from both the
United States and the Soviet Union were holding joint discussions on nuclear technology,
long before talks between members of government agencies, or heads of state took place.
Many issues that might be considered to be on “the international agenda” thrive at the
level of scientific coordination.
An issue might be deemed to be on the international agenda at some level if international
organizations have considered the issue in their governing boards, have allocated
resources to support work on the issue, or have initiated specific projects. The United
Nations Environment Programme, for example, put the issue of ozone depletion on its
agenda in 1975 when it began producing internal reports on ozone depletion and began
deliberations about further institutional responses. In 1977, UNEP created the Programme
on the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
It might be difficult to differentiate a political from a scientific agenda (after all, the
project of which this paper is but a part focuses on the very political nature of the creation
of a scientific agenda), but it is important to identify arenas of discussion which might be
deemed to be political. For example, a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
Resolution to pursue international attention and negotiation on an issue might be one
indicator that an issue is on the international political agenda. However, if the UNGA
calls for action and nation states do not respond, the issue is a dead letter. As such, an
issue may be said to be on the international political agenda if it attracts the attention of
nations, represented by high level government officials or leaders.
The place of the issue on domestic agendas may determine the response of national
governments at the international level. Attention to the issue by representatives of
national governments (i.e. cabinet level personnel, or heads of state), particularly when
voiced in international fora is indicative of an agenda presence for that issue.
Domestically, it is also important to consider what might be called a public agenda,
5judged through attention in national legislative bodies, or through the attention that is
paid by the media, the public, or non-governmental organizations.
The above narrative is not to suggest that an issue proceeds from one kind of agenda to
another in a predictable manner. The presence of an issue in the media may as easily
reflect the state of the issue on one agenda as it may push the issue onto other agendas.
Concerns of national leaders may shape, fund, or encourage efforts on the parts of
international teams of scientists. However, for purposes of this paper, it will be important
to identify, to the extent that it is possible, who is paying attention to the issue of climate
change, when they paid attention, and what the plausible explanation for that attention
may be. The general view of several international scientists and policy makers on the
issue of climate change is clear. The issue of climate change moved from a mostly
scientific arena into an international political one with increasing intensity. By 1990, the
issue had the attention of all of the actors outlined above. Of interest here is the extent to
which assessments contributed to, or shaped, the international agenda.
Scientific Consensus, Frame Changes, and
Internationalization
Conventional wisdom about the international assessments of the mid 1980s is captured by
Jill Jaeger (a participant in the series of assessments in question) and Tim O’Riordan in
the following statement about the Villach 1985 meeting: “[s]cenarios for future emissions
of all of the significant greenhouse gases, not just CO2, were considered and an
international scientific consensus about the potential seriousness of the problem was
achieved. The problem of anthropogenic climate change was moved at this point onto the
political agenda” (Jaeger and  O’Riordan, 1996, p. 14, emphasis added). There are three
components of this statement, all of which point to explanations for the emergence of the
climate issue on the political agenda. The first is the general claim that scientific
consensus about the seriousness of the problem was achieved. The second is that
greenhouse gases in addition to CO2 were considered. The third is that the conclusions
were reached by an international group of scientists, working under the auspices of
international agencies. Each of these components may be important in the case of climate
change. As noted in the introduction, previous work on issues concerned with
international issues that have scientific or technical components, in addition to work done
specifically on the climate change issue, point to the potential importance of these
components, or characteristics of assessment. The evaluation of these components will be
a three step process. First, justification for the importance of these characteristics from
existing literature will be elaborated. Second, evidence from the international assessment
conducted by the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) and its
associated conference will be presented and used to determine the extent to which the
claims are accurate. Finally, the extent to which these characteristics mattered in the
course of the development of responses to climate change will be evaluated.
6Scientific Consensus
Scientific consensus is often identified as a major contributor to decisions to cooperate in
international policy making. Richard Cooper’s account of the development of
international public health guidelines from the 19th century supports this claim. Before
much was known about diseases such as cholera, malaria, and the bubonic plague,
countries adopted wildly different disease control guidelines, if any at all. International
congresses on the subject were marked by tremendous conflict and generally failed to
reach cooperative measures. It was not until the early 1900s, when scientific consensus
had developed, that international cooperation emerged. As Cooper concludes, “[s]o long
as costs are positive and benefits are uncertain, countries are not likely to cooperate
systematically with one another; and so long as sharply differing views are held on the
relationship between actions and outcomes, at least some parties will question the
benefits alleged to flow from any particular proposed course of action” (Cooper, 1989, p.
180-81).
Other accounts corroborate Cooper’s claims. In Peter Haas’s account of action to save the
Mediterranean Sea, consensus among a group of scientists who were able to penetrate the
national policy making apparatus at high levels was the key to cooperation and a
necessary condition for the creation of the Mediterranean Plan. Richard Benedick, in his
account of the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol, suggested that the role of science
was “indispensable” in its success. It was not simply scientific theories and discoveries
that were critical, but the development of consensus about the problem. He writes: “The
best scientists and the most advanced technological resources had to be brought together
in a cooperative effort to build an international scientific consensus” (Benedick, 1991, p.
5). He contends that an international agreement on ozone could not have occurred at any
earlier point in history, due, at least in large part, to the state of scientific agreement about
the problem. Steven Krasner notes that “[w]ithout consensus, knowledge can have little
impact on regime development in a world of sovereign states” (Krasner, 1983, p. 20). The
idea expressed by these observers is that some agreement about the problem and the
relationship between cause and effect is an important determinant of the extent to which
policy and political attention is paid to an issue, as well as the likelihood of international
cooperation.iii
Observers of the development of the climate change issue, in addition to Jaeger and
O’Riordan, suggested that the reason the climate change issue was paid serious attention
in the mid 1980s had essentially to do with the maturity of science, referring to consensus
in a slightly different way. By the mid 1980s, Peter Usher, of the United Nations
Environment Programme noted, “the science was solid” (Usher, 1997). Pier Vellinga, a
coastal engineer from the Netherlands observed that “the pot was boiling” (Vellinga,
1997). While the evidence presented at the first World Climate Conference in 1979 “was
scary”, it took several years for scientists to come up with more evidence, according to
Vellinga. These claims suggest that the conclusions reached by the large gathering of
scientists in 1985, based upon the results in the SCOPE study, represented greater
agreement than had hitherto been present in the international scientific community. This
is the first claim that will be evaluated in this study.
7Issue Framing
Several analyses of the politics of international environmental problem solving have
suggested that the way in which a problem is framed may have ramifications for policy
choices. Thomas Bernauer, Barbara Connolly and Martin List note in their discussions of
the formulation of financial mechanisms for environmental protection that the ways in
which problems are defined bear directly on how action is taken. In Bernauer’s case
study, the initial framing of the problem of Rhine River pollution was useless from the
perspective of solution development. In the case of nuclear safety, because the problem
was framed in a particular way, the solution adopted was retrofitting of reactors, rather
than shutdown. In these cases, both political forces (interest group lobbying and
institutional form) and scientific forces directed these outcomes (Bernauer, 1996;
Connolly and List, 1996).
Several accounts of the development of the climate change issue make a great deal of the
addition of other greenhouse gases to the calculus of the rate of climatic change. Jill
Jaeger and O’Riordan, in elaborating their claims about the new developments that had
emerged by 1985, noted that while scientific papers existed as early as 1975 which linked
other greenhouse gases to the problems of climate change, “the policy implications of this
finding were only slowly realized and the issue of anthropogenic climate change was still
framed as a ‘CO2 problem’ until the mid-1980s” (Jaeger and O’Riordan, 1996, p. 14;
Jaeger, 1997).
Several people have suggested that the Villach conference was critical to altering the
framing of the climate change issue. Rather than being an issue which centered around
CO2, energy, and fossil fuels, the problem was one which included other greenhouse
gases and a complex of environmental issues, and it became a problem that warranted
immediate attention. Alan Hecht and Dennis Tirpak also cite the Villach conference
conclusions, drawing on the Ramanathan paper, as essential to the progress of the climate
change debate: “The information moved the spotlight from CO2 to all trace gases and
accelerated interest in the need for policy actions” (1995, p. 380). Clark and Dickson, in
their study of learning about environmental risks, observed that “[a] wider national
debate on the greenhouse effect would begin to take shape only when America’s narrow
energy/CO2/climate framing of the issue was broken open in the mid-1980s -- principally
in response to developments in the international arena” (1998, p. 17). Villach was a
“catalytic event” for this shift. “Villach’s reframing of the climate issue allowed it to be
amplified through independently increasing concerns over stratospheric ozone depletion.”
(Clark and Dickson, 1998, p. 18).  The claim that the framing of the issue that emerged in
the Villach report was new, “catalytic”, and critical to furthering a wider policy debate
will be the second claim that this study evaluates.
Internationalization
In Peter Haas’(1990) account of the Mediterranean Plan, Richard Benedick’s (1991)
account of the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol, in addition to the studies conducted
8by Marc Levy and Ted Parson (1993) in an edited volume on the subject of international
institutions and environmental protection, the importance of placing the nexus of
scientific discussion at the international level, and in international institutions, is clearly
articulated. International institutions may use science to magnify concern about
environmental problems and transform the prospects for international. Richard
Benedick’s account of the development of the agreement to protect the earth’s ozone
layer noted that the collaboration of an international panel of scientists was critical to the
success of this agreement. Peter Usher, the UNEP representative to the ozone
negotiations, concurred with this characterization (Usher, 1997). Peter M. Haas and
David McCabe (1998) conclude, in their study of the role of international institutions in
the cases of ozone, acid rain, and climate, that access to international institutions
contributed to the ability of a group of scientists to disperse the message about climate
change. Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen, in her comprehensive account of the development
of climate science and climate politics suggests that “[t]he climate threat was raised
successfully in 1985 by a formidable alliance of experienced research managers and
influential institutions meeting in Villach for the Second Joint UNEP/ICSU/WMO
International Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and other Greenhouse Gases in
Climate Variations and Associated Impacts” (1994a, p. 155).
Participants in several assessments during the early 1980s observed that it was time for an
international assessment. Bert Bolin, director of the SCOPE report, observed that
“international assessment was necessary in order to establish the global importance of the
issue” (1994, p. 26). The claim that the international composition and sponsorship played
a role in shaping this outcome will be the third claim explored here.
Was Villach Different?
At the international level, the World Climate Conference, held in 1979, represented an
early major statement on climate change. The conference was organized by the World
Meteorological Organization. The conference called on all nations to unite in efforts to
understand climate change and to plan for it, but it did not call for action to prevent future
climate change although this point was discussed at the time (Kellogg, 1987, p. 124). In
his keynote address, Robert White, the chair of the conference, noted that “the Executive
Committee of the WMO has specifically asked this Conference to recommend whether a
conference at the ministerial level should be convened to take necessary international
actions” (WMO, 1979, p. 8). Conference participants ultimately recommended more
research, which would require coordination among international bodies. However, the
declaration noted that “It is fully recognized that the international co-operation which is
the prerequisite for any world climate programme can only be successfully pursued under
conditions of peace” (WMO, 1979, p. 716).
A joint conference, sponsored by UNEP, WMO and ICSU, under the auspices of their
jointly sponsored World Climate Programme, was held in Villach, Austria in 1980. Its
purpose was to provide a “carefully prepared scientific assessment of the CO2 question to
provide them with guidance in their future activities and advice to nations” (World
9Climate Programme, 1981, p. 2) Experts on the assessment of the role of CO2 on climate
variations and their impact contributed reviews of observed changes of CO2, the man-
made sources of CO2 and the role of the biosphere, the carbon cycle and the prediction of
future atmospheric CO2 concentrations, climate change due to increasing CO2, cryosphere
and ecosystem effects, in addition to economic and social impacts. The conference
concluded that “[t]he probability that potentially serious impacts may be realized is
sufficiently great that an international commitment to a programme of co-operation in
research is required to illuminate the issues and to reduce uncertainties so that the
dimensions and time scale of the problem can be more reliably ascertained.” However,
the assessment concluded that because of existing scientific uncertainties, the
development of management plan for CO2 was premature.
The sponsoring organizations agreed to the conduct of another assessment, due in 1985.
This assessment, and an associated conference, would be coordinated by UNEP, WMO,
and ICSU. These institutions did hold an interim study conference in 1983, “On
Sensitivity of Ecosystems and Society to Climate Change” (World Climate Programme,
1984). This was essentially an impact assessment, which brought biologists and climate
modelers together. The goal was for biologists “to define the scope of their impact
research in light of the climate modeling capabilities, and climate modelers [to] identify
the key climate variables required for impact assessment” (World Climate Programme,
1984, p. 3).
An introduction to the 1983 report noted that “some advances in our understanding of the
problem of CO2 induced climatic changes has taken place” since Villach-1 (1980). The
introduction was based upon reports presented by scientists Bolin, Gates, MacCracken,
and Wigley. A summary of key points, however, reveals very little change in many of the
essential findings. In the case of a few estimates, the range of uncertainty was widened as
the result of further analysis. The report suggested that pre-industrial concentrations of
CO2 were lower than had been previously thought, and as such, the increase in CO2
concentrations from pre-industrial concentrations was 22 - 31%. Projections of future
concentrations of CO2 were considered to remain unchanged (440 ppm plus or minus 10
by 2025), (although new estimates of pre-industrial levels meant that by 2025, this figure
would represent a 70% (plus or minus 20) increase). General circulation models (GCMs)
confirmed previous results of a 1.5 - 4° C increase in global surface temperature, though
the range of uncertainty could actually be larger, given “a fuller recognition of the
omission of several., possibly important, feed-back mechanisms”. Continued work on
“estimating past emissions due to fossil fuel combustion, deforestation and changing land
use have not altered significantly the estimated values given in Villach-1”(World Climate
Programme, 1984, p. 3). As this was a conference to focus on the sensitivity of various
ecosystems, and not to evaluate the general claims about global climate change, the
conference went no further than recommending further work on impact assessments.
The assessment that formed the background for the 1985 conference was published by
SCOPE, a committee of ICSU; it was funded primarily by UNEP, in addition to the
WMO, SCOPE/ICSU, the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the Swedish Board for
Energy Research and the International Meteorological Institute in Stockholm (SCOPE,
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1986, p. xvii). Work on the assessment was conducted at the International Meteorological
Institute in Stockholm beginning in 1982 (Bolin, 1994, p. 26). The report noted that while
“a number of assessments of [the possibility of climatic change] have been made by
national groups, notably in the United States”, “[t]he problem is clearly an international
one and an assessment at the international level therefore seems desirable to serve as a
basis for discussion and possibly, at some stage, for the development of an action plan”
(SCOPE, 1986, p. xv).
Several accounts of the development of climate science suggested that the SCOPE report
and its associated conference reached the kind of agreement about the science of climate
change that made the relationship between action and outcomes clear, and provided a
basis for knowledge to inform decision making. Evaluation of this consensus claim is
very straightforward. The scientific conclusions of the SCOPE report can be compared to
the conclusions of assessments that were issued before it. The questions that must be
asked include the following: what were the major conclusions of this assessment and how
to they compare to previous international assessments? How do they compare to national
assessments? What were the claims made about consensus?
The SCOPE report presented the following major findings. It reported on current levels
of CO2 concentrations, and suggest that other greenhouse gases may be equally
important. It made estimates for climatic change, and evaluates the effect of such changes
on sea level, agriculture, and ecosystems.
The report noted an observed increase in CO2 concentrations to 343 ppmv (1984) from
315 ppmv (1958). They noted that they knew the amount of CO2 emitted by fossil fuel
combustion and changing land use. As such, the observed increase can be related to
human activities. Future global energy demand will determine future emissions. Based on
this information, the report estimated a range of concentration increases, the upper bound
of which implies that CO2 concentrations might double by the middle of the next century
(2050), while the lower bound implies that a doubling of CO2 concentration will not be
reached until 2100 (p. xxvii).
Other greenhouse gases and aerosols are also an important part of the equation. The
report concluded hat the equilibrium temperature change due to increasing concentrations
of other greenhouse gases and aerosols is estimated to be about half of the temperature
change attributed to the increase of atmospheric CO2 alone. “The combined
concentrations of atmospheric CO2 and other greenhouse gases would be equivalent to a
doubling of CO2 possibly as early as the third decade of the next century” (SCOPE,
1986, p. xxvii). CFCs may become as important as CO2, but the report acknowledged that
the biogeochemical cycles of other GHGs are little understood, and the report finds the
data “inadequate as a basis for policy decisions on how to reduce or limit the future
growth of their concentrations”.
The report concludes that a doubling of CO2 (or its equivalent) is likely to result in a
temperature change in the range of 1.5 - 5.5  C, noting that “the expected change of the
global mean temperature due to a doubling of CO2 is of about the same magnitude as the
change of global temperature form the last glacial period to the present interglacial”.
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Such temperature changes will have profound effects on global ecosystems, as well as
agriculture, forests, and sea level rise could be 20 - 165 cm. However, data for the effect
on agriculture and forests in different latitudes is lacking.
The scientific conclusions reached by this assessment were passed on to the participants
in the 1985 International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide
and of other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts. Held in
Villach, Austria, the conference was sponsored by UNEP, ICSU, and the WMO. The
scientific executive summary was provided by the SCOPE report, mentioned above. The
89 conference participants were scientists from 29 developed and developing countries
and the three sponsoring organizations. This group was to determine how to deal with the
major uncertainties in existing knowledge, discuss “the nature of international
collaboration and action that might be necessary now”, and elaborate research priorities.
As the conference chairman, James Bruce, detailed the task of participants as follows: “to
develop a consensus statement on the present state of our scientific knowledge of
increases in CO2 and other radiatively active gases, and the physical and socio-economic
impacts, and to develop sound recommendations for action by countries and by
international agencies, based on this scientific consensus” (WMO, 1986, p. 7)
James Bruce, the chair of the Villach conference, noted that one day was dedicated to
scientific and technical presentations and debate concerning the scientific conclusions.
He recalled that there was very little dissent among the participants; the SCOPE report
was viewed to be the best assessment available at the time.
The report identified the conclusion that trace gases (CO2, as well as nitrous oxide (N2O),
methane (CH4), ozone (O3), and chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) are increasing, noting that
gases other than CO2 are already almost as important as CO2. Under these conditions, the
combined concentrations could be radiatively equivalent to a doubling of CO2 from pre-
industrial levels as early as 2030. This conclusion was the same as the SCOPE
conclusion. The consequences of this doubling, they noted, would be an increase in the
global mean equilibrium surface temperature of between 1.5 and 4.5 °C, an estimate
which reduced the range cited by the SCOPE report by 1 degree at the upper end. The
conference conclusion noted that regional divergence from the global average will exist.
The conference estimated that this warming would lead to sea level rise of between 20 -
140 centimeters (25 cm less at the upper end than the SCOPE report), and that there is
little doubt that the warming would have “profound effects on global ecosystems,
agriculture, water resources and sea ice” (SCOPE, 1986, p. xxii). Unlike the SCOPE
report, the conference did not state that the observed increase in temperature was
attributable to increases in CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Instead, they noted that the
observed warming is consistent with that which would be predicted based upon the
observed increase in CO2 and other gases, “although it cannot be ascribed in a
scientifically rigorous manner to these factors alone” (WMO, 1986, p. xxii).
The conference made some very general observations about the consequences of such a
scientific understanding.iv First, in a statement which many observers attribute to the
conference chair Jim Bruce, they noted many important decisions are being taken by
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governments which assume that past climatic data are a reliable guide to the future. This
is no longer a good idea; the statement concluded, noting that there was a need for
“refined estimates of future climate conditions to improve” decisions about water
resources management, agriculture, coastal engineering, and energy planning. They
suggested that the climate change issue was closely linked to other major environmental
issues, particularly acid deposition and ozone depletion, and that the rate and degree of
future warming “could be profoundly affected by governmental policies on energy
conservation, use of fossil fuels, and the emission of some greenhouse gases”(WMO,
1986, p.1). The conference recommended that governments take the findings of the
conference into account when developing policies, encouraged an increase in the
dissemination of public information on greenhouse gases, made several recommendations
for future research. It also called for WMO, UNEP and ICSU to establish a task force on
greenhouse gases and to ensure that periodic scientific assessment is undertaken and that
further mechanisms to encourage further national and international research and action
were established. If deemed necessary, they concluded, these agencies should initiate
consideration of a global convention.
With the details of the SCOPE and Villach 1985 consensus outlined, it is possible to
compare these results to the results presented in prior assessments. Comparisons should
be made on several dimensions. 1. Projected warming due to a doubling of CO2, 2. Date
by which this warming is expected to occur, 3. Relative contribution of CO2 and other
gases, and 4. the nature of the recommended response. A chapter in the SCOPE report
does a great deal of this work, as one chapter consists of a synthesis of present
knowledge, outlining the findings of previous assessments and contrasting them with the
SCOPE study findings.
The striking result of this comparison is that the SCOPE report does not differ
significantly from the reports which preceded it, particularly in terms of the scientific
conclusions. The predicted range of temperature change appears to be very similar across
reports, and over time. O’Riordan and Jaeger note that 1979 United States National
Academy of Science report concluded that a doubling of the CO2 concentration would
lead to an increase of the average temperature of the earth’s surface of between 1.5. and
4.5 °C. Write Jaeger and O’Riordan, “up to and including the 1994 IPCC assessment, the
scientific consensus was that there was no reason to widen or narrow this range” (1996,
p. 14).  In the 1979 “Charney Report”, the range was put at 1.5 - 4.5 °C as did the 1983
United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the 1981 Villach conference.
If anything, the SCOPE report (following the interim Villach conclusions of 1983)
widened the range of uncertainty for such a warming, and projects a slower pace than the
earlier Villach (1981) conclusions. The report estimated the temperature change due to a
doubling of CO2 and other greenhouse gases would likely be in the range of 1.5 - 5.5 °C.
The projected date of doubling of CO2 did not vary a great deal, as a low CO2 emissions
scenario would mean that “a doubling of CO2 will be reached only after the year 2100”
(SCOPE, 1986, p. 11). A middle range scenario put doubling near the end of the next
century. The upper range scenario suggested doubling by about 2050. The authors noted
that “[t]hese conclusions suggest a somewhat slower development than that discussed in
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the first WMO/ICSU/UNEP assessment (World Climate Programme, 1981), and in the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences study (CDAC, 1983)” (SCOPE, 1986, p. 11).
It should be noted that the SCOPE report was able to present its results on the basis of
improved scientific methods. “The assessments shows an improved understanding of
global carbon cycle in recent years” (SCOPE, 1986, p. 11). Advances in methods
continued to confirm the same parameters for current and expected CO2 (and other gas)
concentrations, and expected temperature change, and results were reported with
increasing confidence.
The report was not the first to note the importance of other greenhouse gases, although
the report benefited from the appearance of an important 1985 paper by Ramanathan et
al., which provided compelling evidence for the claim that other greenhouse gases could
be as important as CO2. For example, the 1983 National Research Council (NRC) report
made a very compelling argument for the idea that CO2 should not remain the sole focus
of research efforts, nor, more importantly, the sole focus of the formulation of solutions.
Indeed, the NRC group concluded that it might be easier to reach international agreement
on other GHGs.
On the question of policy recommendations, the SCOPE report, together with the Villach
conference, differed from prior assessments. It was the first to state that “substantial
warming” would occur as a result of a doubling of CO2, to note that increases in CO2
“were attributable to human activities”, and to recommend a variety of specific policy
actions. The NRC report, for example, concluded that scientific uncertainties concerning
the projects of future CO2 emissions were sufficiently great that no statements of the
certainty of any future climatic changes, or the consequences thereof could or should be
made. As such, they suggest further research, rather than quick policy action to address
fossil fuel use.
The results of this comparison suggest that the substance of scientific conclusions were
not significantly different from prior assessments. However, the conclusions that the
scientists reached based upon the scientific analyses were significantly different. The
Villach 1985 report made bolder statements about the implications of the scientific
findings for policy making, and urged more significant steps toward international
cooperation on the issue of climate change, calling for governments to recognize that
future climate change could be stemmed by attention to policies concerning fossil fuel
use, energy conservation, and greenhouse gas emissions. This stands in contrast to the
conclusions reached just a few years earlier by the U.S. National Research Council as it
advocated “caution not panic”, and weighed in against the development of policies to
limit CO2 emissions.
What Accounts for Villach’s Conclusions?
The first question that must be addressed concerns why this group reached different
conclusions that those of its predecessors, taking the leap into the policy / political arena.
This question may have several answers. The first concerns the institutional auspices
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under which the assessment was carried out. The conjecture is that this independent
group of international scientists, convened by UNEP, ICSU, and WMO were able to
make recommendations that their colleagues involved in national assessments were
unable to make, for political, or other, reasons. The second concerns the extent to which
individual scientists, and the group as a whole, had come to the realization that it was
time to act, or that there was an opportunity to act. This conclusion could be the result of
a build up of years of considering the issue and the observation that scientific estimates
consistently pointed to a human contribution to warming trends, or observations that the
ozone negotiations were experiencing some success, and as such, other global
environmental accords could follow.
The absence of domestic political constraints on the conclusions reached by this body
cannot be underestimated as a source of leeway in reaching policy conclusions. The
scientists attending the Villach conference attended in their personal capacities, not as
representatives of their governments. They were selected by the three partner agencies. If
they were selected by UNEP and WMO, they were likely to be government scientists, or
scientists on contract to government. If selected by ICSU, they were mostly academic
scientists. Although they came to the conference from 29 countries (both developed and
developing), they were asked to “shed their national policy perspectives” and to address
the global issues in as comprehensive a way as possible (Bruce, 1997).
The mandate handed to the group came from two intergovernmental organizations
(UNEP and WMO) and a non-governmental organization (ICSU). As James Bruce noted,
the call for policy recommendations was strongly made by the sponsoring agencies.
Tolba urged the participants to recommend the establishment of an international
coordinating committee on greenhouse gases, and to discuss in greater detail the options
being placed before the world’s leaders, encouraging a “wider debate on such issues as
the costs and benefits of a radical shift away from fossil fuel consumption” (WMO, 1986,
p. 12). It was the hope of James Dooge, speaking on behalf of ICSU, that this conference
would “provide a first approach to a sound foundation and appropriate guidelines for the
development of the necessary policies at the national and international level” (WMO,
1986, p. 17). The WMO representative, Donald Smith, seemed the least activist of the
three, urging a clear statement of current knowledge on changes in atmospheric changes
and consequent effects for the use of policy makers, and guidance for future research to
reduce uncertainties.
As a conference convened by these institutions, both intergovernmental and non-
governmental, the approach was at the global level. The task was not to assess the climate
problem with a view to understanding what subsequent policy action would be in the best
interests of a particular country. Rather, the perspective was a global one. The question of
whether the political climate or structure of interests within a particular nation would be
amenable to making changes in fossil fuel consumption, or other greenhouse gas
emissions. By definition, the conclusions reached by this conference were not
accountable to national agencies, or legislative bodies that would be charged with
implementing such conclusions. For example, the NRC report notes that its primary focus
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was on CO2, with a bit of attention paid to other greenhouse gases, for reasons having
explicitly to do with the mandate and sponsor of the assessment. As Tom Schelling put it:
The protagonist of this study has been carbon dioxide. The research has been
motivated by concern that atmospheric carbon dioxide is increasing and may
increase faster as the use of fossil fuels continues to grow and by the known
potential for a ‘greenhouse effect’ that could generate worldwide changes in
climate. The group responsible for the report is the Carbon Dioxide Assessment
Committee; the study was authorized by an act of Congress concerned with
carbon-intensive fuels; and the agency principally charged with managing the
research is the Department of Energy. The topic is usually referred to as ‘the
carbon dioxide problem’,’ a global challenge to the management of energy
resources. (NRC, 1983, p. 450)
The Villach conference made recommendations that were in keeping not only with the
goals of its organizational sponsors (continuing global climate research and policy advice
for a global accord on the control of greenhouse gases), but that were in keeping with its
perch in the international arena and consideration of the global commons.
Recalling that this same group of agencies convened a similar conference in 1980 may
beg the question of why they reached one set of conclusions in 1980, and quite a different
set in 1985. The conclusions of the 1980 conference were significantly more cautious,
urging more research, rather than policy development. There are two factors which may
help to illuminate why, in 1985, the group was not recommending only further research
as the first priority of the global community; this international group was ready to engage
the policy making community directly. The first concerns the scientists perceptions of
how they should judge uncertainty, and in how they interpreted what these results (given
existing uncertainty) meant for the scientists in terms of the risks that were present, and,
ultimately, for how they should respond. The second concerns the opportunities that the
international arena presented for the success of international environmental agreements.
The two are interrelated.
In general, William Kellogg suggests “[s]cientists are trained to be cautious about
jumping to conclusions too fast, and furthermore we will always be awed by the
complexity of the planetary climate system and aware of our inability to understand all its
interactions” (Kellogg, 1987, p. 122). As such, Kellogg concludes, scientists will be
reluctant to make bold policy. Steve Schneider has suggested, in several venues, that
making judgments about taking action is a value judgment, not a scientific one. In
response to a question and remark by Senator Bradley in 1988 Senate Hearings,
Schneider suggested the following:
Earlier he [Senator Bradley] was suggesting that the science may be sufficient to
justify action. I just wanted to make very clear -- as a scientist, I have to do this
and for my colleagues as well -- that whether we should take action, of course, is
a value judgment about whether we fear more having the future descend on us
with rapid change or whether we fear more investing present resources to hedge
against that. In my value system, I believe in insurance. I am conservative in that
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sense. I think a little insurance that, as Senator Wirth said, also has high leverage,
makes good sense. But that, of course, is not a judgment that is scientific”
(Schneider, 1989).
Schneider noted that policy choice moves beyond the realm of scientific expertise, into
the realm of political values.
What urged these scientists to leave the realm of scientific judgment and enter the realm
of political values, to, in the words of Kellogg, “stick their necks out”? The accounts of
several scientists suggest that the finally realized that significant global warming could
occur within their lifetime (or at least in the lifetimes of their children). The written
record suggests that the addition of other greenhouse gases to the climate change calculus
was an essential consideration for the participants of this conference. Tolba (UNEP) and
Smith (WMO) mention the contribution of greenhouse gases as a factor which tipped the
balance in favor of action to stem global climate change. Noted Tolba, “It is now
estimated that by adding in the warming effect of other trace gases the equivalent of such
a [CO2] doubling may occur as early as 2030. Trace gases seem to be playing a much
larger role in bringing about a greenhouse effect than was earlier expected” (WMO,
1986, p. 11). Donald Smith nearly dismissed the importance of further debate about
carbon dioxide and global warming, noting that
the concept that increasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere could lead to a
global warming of the surface of the Earth has been known for some time. In fact,
this topic has been a subject of scientific curiosity since 1863 when Tyndall first
raised it. But society’s concern about the potential global consequences of the CO2
increase has been much more recent. There is another concern for us today.
Nearly 290 man-made chemical substances whose presence has been detected in
the troposphere could, as their atmospheric concentration increases, add
substantially to the warming trend expected from carbon dioxide (WMO, 1986, p.
13)
The written observations of Bert Bolin and Jill Jaeger suggest that the claim that other
greenhouse gases could be as important as CO2 in determining future climatic change,
was critical in making a response to climate change urgent. Despite the publication of a
paper in 1985 by Ramanathan (which Bolin viewed as significant), this conference was
not the first time that this finding was presented. The claim had been present in both the
scientific and assessment literature for several years. However, as Jim Bruce observed,
the finding that greenhouse gases were the radiative equivalent of CO2 made greenhouse
gases “the biggest buzz of the conference” (Bruce, 1997).
The Villach gathering appears to have provided an opportunity for climate scientists to
internationally acknowledge the importance of the scientific finding, and to discuss its
significance with one another, and to convey the finding to a larger community of
scientists with practical concerns. The importance that this group attached to this finding
was reflected in one of the three general conference conclusions, in which the group
noted that while some warming appears inevitable, the “rate and degree of future
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warming could be profoundly affected by governmental policies on energy conservation,
use of fossil fuels, and the emission of some greenhouse gases” (WMO, 1986, p. 1).
The first general conclusion of the conference suggests another source of initiatives to
move the climate change issue from an academic arena to a policy one. The statement
reads as follows:
Many important economic and social decisions are being made today on long-
term projects...all based on the assumption that past climatic data, without
modification, are a reliable guide to the future. This is no longer a good
assumption since the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases are expected
to cause a significant warming of the global climate in the next century (WMO,
1986, p. 1).
It was arguably the dynamic created by this particular gathering of scientists that spurred
them to recommend high level policy action on the climate change issue. The group
gathered at Villach included not only those scientists who had been concerned with
questions related to climate change, atmospheric chemistry, and meteorology, but those
who were biologists and other natural scientists who had not been principally concerned
with climate, as well as engineers. It was a group that was more inclined to consideration
of the practical implications of scientific findings, by virtue of their capacities in
government bureaus. These government scientists had not been deeply involved with
climate science and were surprised by the findings, and the implications for the speed
with which changes in climate change could occur. As Pier Vellinga, a sea coast engineer
who joined the Villach process shortly after 1985 noted, the findings of Villach forced
him to realize that even the lower bounds of climate change predictions would necessitate
a transformation of his whole field.
Some evidence suggests that participants at Villach had been approached by policy
relevant actors in their home countries. These actors, those responsible for hydropower
planning, agricultural policy, or coastal engineering, were increasingly aware of evidence
of global atmospheric change. Anecdotally, Steve Schneider notes that between 1979 and
1989 “news of global atmospheric change was moving up from the back pages of the
science sections of newspapers and magazines, particularly when bad weather (like heat
waves) struck”(Schneider, 1989), and business and other institutions were increasingly
discussing climate issues. Jim Bruce, who was the Assistant Deputy Minister for the
Atmospheric Environment Service in Canada at the time of Villach, was approached by a
representative of the government of the province of Alberta. The official wanted to know
if they were “throwing good money after bad” when they bailed out drought stricken
farms, asking whether the area was simply going to be a dry area in the future. According
to Bruce, the group as a whole came to the conclusion that a lot of decisions were being
made world wide that rested on assumptions about a stable climate, or a future climate
that was like the past climate. This spurred the group to strongly urge careful
consideration of current scientific findings in the development of government policy, and
to suggest that efforts should be made at the international level to reach agreement about
the emission of greenhouse gases.
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These dynamics meant that the climate change issue became more urgent for this group.
The finding focusing on other greenhouse gases was new to non climate scientists, and
merited attention. The climate scientists used this to motivate their new call for urgent
action, as this calculation meant that significant change could occur as early as 2030.
Once the calculations included CO2 AND other greenhouse gases, Jaeger recalled, it was
clear that significant changes in global temperature were projected to occur within 30 - 50
years, rather than late in the next century. This she noted, meant that climate change was
a problem for the current generation, not one that could wait to be addressed. Bert Bolin,
in an account of the SCOPE report, echoed Jaeger’s sense of the importance of the
addition of greenhouse gases:
An important paper by Ramanathan et al. became available towards the end of the
assessment, in which the role of other greenhouse gases in enhancing the
greenhouse effect was pointed out. These other gases proved to be as important as
CO2. Suddenly, the climate change issue became much more urgent. The radiative
forcing of the atmosphere, corresponding to a doubling of the CO2 concentration,
was anticipated by about 2030 rather than during the latter part of next century
(Bolin, 1986, p. 26).
Jill Jaeger describes the effect on the group of scientists at Villach as a sort of “a ha”, or
“wow, significant change could take place in our lifetimes. While evidence for the
importance of greenhouse gases had been mounting between 1980 and 1985, this group
of scientists mobilized around the finding and used it to justify a call for urgent action.
In addition to catalyzing a new group of actors around the idea that the climate issue
needed to move from the scientific arena to the policy arena, the Villach conference also
featured a reversal of opinion for Thomas Malone, the chair of the 1983 NRC report,
who, in 1984 testified before Congress about the need for “caution not panic”,
elaborating the uncertainties in climate science.v In concluding remarks to the conference,
Malone noted that “as a reversal of a position I held a year or so ago, I believe it is timely
to start on the long, tedious and sensitive task of framing a CONVENTION on
greenhouse gases, climate change, and energy”(WMO, 1986, p. 33).
The reasons for Malone’s reversal suggest that another reason for the policy conclusions
of the group. In a reflection on the previous decade of discussion on the climate change
issue, Thomas Malone (who participated in a 1975 WMO Panel on Climate for the WMO
Executive Committee), noted that the most important development of the last decade was
“the finding that increases in the ‘other’ greenhouse gases...have contributed about one
half of any equilibrium temperature change that might be ascribed to the increase in CO2”
(WMO, 1986). He calls the finding a “surprise”, significant because it meant that the date
of potentially serious environmental consequences was several decades earlier than had
been previously anticipated”. However, careful readers will recall that Malone’s report
did include other greenhouse gases in their analysis, yet they advocated caution. For
Malone, and perhaps for others, there is more to the story of the decision for action.
Malone cites several other developments of the latest decade, including improvements in
climate models, as well as attention to the impact of climate change on ecosystems.
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However, he ultimately noted that a decision to initiate contact between scientists and
policy makers was a timely one. He concluded that there had been a growing perception
that there was a wide range of human activities which could “produce changes on a
global scale”. The ozone agreement, he suggested, was indicative of this change in
perception. This stands in stark contrast to the conclusion that the NRC report reached
about the likelihood of achieving international agreement on climate change (let alone the
prospects of getting parties to the table). In 1983, the NRC Report concluded that
Given the need for widespread, long-term commitment, a CO2 control strategy
could only work if major nations successfully negotiated a global policy. While
such an outcome is possible, there are few examples where a multinational
environmental pact has succeeded, the nuclear test ban treaty being the most
prominent. Other clearly recognized problems --whale fisheries, acid rain,
undersea mining, the ozone layer -- emphasize how time on the order of decades
is required to achieve even modest progress on international management
strategies. (NRC, 1983, p. 70)
The report went on to note that the participation of the Soviet Union would be essential,
and that it was hard to see why the Soviet Union would even participate.
The successful negotiation of an ozone convention, as reflected in Malone’s remarks, is
yet another reason that the policy mandate and the emphasis on other greenhouse gases
and the move to policy recommendations made sense for this group. By March of 1985
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer had been adopted. UNEP,
and Tolba in particular, were encouraged by their success in negotiating the ozone
agreement, and had determined that a convention on climate change could be their next
endeavor. Peter Usher, a major representative of UNEP in the ozone negotiations, notes
that as a result of the success of negotiating the Vienna Convention, UNEP had found a
niche as a broker of conventions, and it was a role that UNEP wanted to continue. Tolba
and the scientists involved in the Villach meetings saw a window of opportunity, through
which they could push climate change. Like Malone, they viewed the ozone agreement as
a breakthrough in the treatment of global environmental issues.
Most, if not all, of those who made formal statements to the Villach gathering mentioned
the connections that needed to be drawn between climate change and other environmental
issues, particularly ozone depletion. James Bruce’s remarks emphasized the connections
between acid rain, ozone depletion and climate change. William Clark’s account of the
practical implications of increasing greenhouse gas emissions noted that the problem of
greenhouse gases was “intimately linked to other problems”. The general thrust of the
remarks was that tackling one global atmospheric issue necessitated consideration of a
spate of others.
Was Villach Important?
There is little evidence to support the claim that the Villach conference marked a change
in scientific consensus. The basic predictions of warming due to a doubling of CO2 or its
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equivalent and the range of decades in which doubling could be expected to occur were
roughly consistent between 1981 and 1985, and those who disagreed still disagreed in
1985. However, a change did seem to occur in the conclusions, or policy judgments, that
were reached based upon the scientific findings. In addition, the group did focus some
additional attention on the role of other greenhouse gases. The group concluded that
policies on energy, the use of fossil fuels, and emission of greenhouse gases could
strongly affect the rate and degree of future warming. Explanations for this shift rest
largely on the nature of the scientific community that was created at the meeting, and by
the timely and advantageous connections to ozone.
The next question concerns the effect that these changes had on the position of climate
change on several international agendas. What was done with, or as a result of the
conclusions of Villach? It is clear that climate change was well established on the agenda
of international groups of scientists, a position which was solidified by the Villach 1985
gathering. What evidence is there that the Villach findings affected changes in the
agendas of international specialized agencies, the United Nations general assembly,
national politics, the media, or the public? What paths to these agendas from the Villach
findings can be identified? How were the findings diffused? Which of the uses or paths of
diffusion were due to the policy recommendations of the group, the attention to other
greenhouse gases, or to the fact that the assessment and conference were conducted by
international organizations? How much was due to the aforementioned ozone agreement,
or other factors?
The diffusion of the Villach conclusions can be traced down several paths to several
agendas. First, national governments, particularly the United States, took notice. Second,
the sponsoring organizations took on additional action, as did the United Nations General
Assembly. Third, the participating scientists pursued further connections to policy.
Fourth, independent international conferences drew on the Villach findings. In general, it
is not clear that the intensified focus on other greenhouse gases figured into subsequent
debate and discussion. As the diffusion of Villach’s conclusions unfolds, the focus
remains almost exclusively on CO2 and fossil fuel reduction. There is no evidence that
new groups of actors emerged to press the climate change issue onto the agenda as a
result of the fact that other greenhouse gases were considered to be as important as CO2.
For example, subsequent debates did not feature coalitions of cattle ranchers or rice
paddy farmers. The substance of this finding wasn’t as important as the fact that it
provided a justification for the urgency of action.
At the time of the Villach conference, the group did not engage in efforts to distribute its
conclusions. Despite the fact that the conference recommended an increase in public
information efforts on issues related to climate change, including the wide distribution of
the documents of this conference, such efforts were not made by the leadership of the
conference.
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National Agendas
The report received a more attention in the United States than it otherwise might have on
account of the disagreement that the Department of Energy officials had with it. They
returned to the U.S. and quite loudly complained about the conclusions, suggesting that
the Villach group was not representative enough to be dictating the terms of international
action.
Indeed, the conclusions of the Villach conference, the subsequent creation of the
Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, and increasing attention to policy
recommendations through the Villach and Bellagio gatherings of 1987, led some
governments to conclude that these actions were too far outside the realm of government
control to be desirable. According to Peter Usher, governments distrusted the subsequent
Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, suggesting that it was not broad based enough,
and that they preferred an international forum which featured their own government
scientists in international negotiations. This outcome suggests that some of the attention
that Villach received stemmed from the fact that it had successfully approached the
problem from a global perspective, without regard to the interests of particular nations.
This perception was especially prevalent in the United States, although the American
story is a slightly complicated one. Within the United States there was interagency
conflict over the negotiation of a convention. The Department of Energy “felt strongly
that the Villach report was inadequate because it was not prepared by government
officials” (Hecht and Tirpak, 1995, p. 381), while the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Department of State supported the idea. Debate and a resulting compromise led
the U.S. to support the intergovernmental panel on climate change. The details of this
process are highlighted by Shardul Agrawala (1997) in his account of the creation of the
IPCC, but the essential feature was that the panel would be constituted of nationally
nominated scientists.
Jill Jaeger’s account of climate science and politics in (then West) Germany emphasizes
connections between international developments and domestic attention (Jaeger, 1997;
Bares et al., 1998). German climatologist Egon Degens attended the Villach 1985
conference. He was subsequently involved in discussions of the importance of the climate
change issue, particularly with the German Physical Society (DPG), which had been
examining the climate change issue since the early 1980s. A November 1985 report by
the DPG is credited with bringing the climate change issue to the attention of many
Germans.
The report, “Warnung vor einer drohenden Klimakatastrophe” (“Warning of a
threatening climate catastrophe”) “...predicted an apocalyptic ‘climate catastrophe’ due to
fossil-fuel combustion and deforestation. Press coverage of the report featured scenes of
cracked, dry earth and the Cologne Cathedral deluged by the North Sea” (Bares et al.,
1998, p. 14). The report was picked up by the media in a January 1986 press conference
and was widely disseminated, driving the agenda for climate policy in Germany. The
Enquete Commission on Preventive Measures for Protection of the Earth’s Atmosphere
published its first interim report in 1988. Recommendations that climate change was a
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serious threat which warranted preventive action immediately was addressed and
approved by the West German Bundestag.
The United Nations Agenda
According to James Bruce, the conference report was used principally as an internal
document by WMO and UNEP, and was not used as part of a public information (or
government information) campaign. As such, the conclusions were used to develop the
agenda of climate change within the United Nations specialized agencies. The
recommendation of the Villach conference (and the wish of Mostafa Tolba) was fulfilled
through the creation of the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) which was
intended to further science and policy, and make recommendations on the development
of a climate convention. This group did meet after Villach, in July 1986. The experts
were nominated (two each) by UNEP, WMO, and ICSU. The AGGG approved a plan for
a conference to be organized under its auspices. The work of the conference is detailed in
the section concerned the agenda of scientists. Based upon the conclusions of that
conference, the AGGG adopted a work plan for itself in 1988; the results of the work was
published in four volumes in 1990. This work is beyond the purview of the study (see
rather Agrawala, 1997).
The Villach conclusions coincided not only with increasing attention in the UNEP and
WMO, but also in the United Nations General Assembly. In 1982, a special session of
UNEP’s Governing Council was held to review progress since the Stockholm Conference
of 1972. The Council concluded that more long-term environmental planning was
needed. The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was created
in UN General Assembly resolution 38/161 in the 38th Session of the United Nations in
1983, and chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, then leader of the Norwegian Labour
Party. The so-called Brundtland Commission was charged to
re-examine the critical environment and development issues and to formulate
realistic proposals for dealing with them; to propose new forms of international
co-operation on these issues that will influence policies and events in the direction
of needed changes; and to raise the levels of understanding and commitment to
action of individuals, voluntary organizations, businesses, institutes, and
governments (WCED, 1987, p. 4)
The report analyzed a wide range of environment and development issues, and
recommended the creation of a UN Programme on Sustainable Development and, later,
an international conference to review progress on these issues. The report is often
accorded a great deal of credit for the development of international environmental policy.
Among the issues which demanded attention were issues of particular concern to
developing countries (desertification, deforestation, pollution, and poverty induced by
environmental degradation) and industrialized countries (toxic chemicals and wastes and
acidification). All nations, the report notes, face suffering caused by “releases by
industrialized countries of carbon dioxide and of gases that react with the ozone layer,
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and from any future war fought with the nuclear arsenals controlled by those nations”
(WCED, 1987, p. 22). The Commission report consulted with thousands of individuals
from around the world, heard hours of testimony in public hearings, and read numerous
submissions.
Rather than mounting a more extensive analysis of the effect of the Brundtland
Commission report on the development and framing of a wide variety of environmental
issues, in addition to the initiation of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), it is important to note the relevance of the report to the more
narrowly focused story of climate change. Beyond a general emphasis on global
atmospheric problems, the report’s account of the problem of climate change draws
almost exclusively on the Villach conference findings. Several paragraphs of conclusions
paraphrase and cite the Villach 1985 text. While the Brundtland Report notes that, based
on the scientific evidence, particularly in light many complexities and uncertainties, “it is
urgent that the process [of taking action]start now” (1987, p. 176).
Gordon Goodman, key Villach participant, and member of the AGGG, was directly
involved in the work of the Brundtland Commission. He served as part of a “Group of
Special Advisers” on Energy; several observers of climate science credit him with
drafting the sections of the report concerned with climate change (Bolin, 1997; Jaeger,
1997; Clark, 1997). There is no evidence that any of the individuals with primary
responsibility for the SCOPE 29 report or the Villach conference communicated in verbal
or written form with the Commission. Michael Oppenheimer and George Woodwell,
who, together with Goodman initiated the subsequent Villach / Bellagio 1987 meetings
(discussed below), are often credited with the dissemination of the urgency of the
problem of climate change do not appear to have had direct contact with the
Commission.vi However, indirect consultations between government representatives and
others who testified and those who contributed to the Villach conclusions is likely, but no
direct trail is apparent.
The fact that the Villach report was mentioned in the Brundtland Commission, and
shaped its recommendations (in fact, constituted its recommendations) on action to
protect the earth’s climate, meant that the Villach message enjoyed wide dissemination.
The Commission and its report enjoyed a high profile, and consequently, served to raise
the profile of a number of environmental issues in the global arena. The report was
reprinted six times in 1987, three times in 1988, and three times in 1989. A revised
edition was published in 1988. The presentation of the report’s findings to the General
Assembly in 1987 provoked a significant discussion about climate change, featuring a
intervention by the representative from the Maldives which helped to bring the issue of
climate change into the forefront. Moreover, as noted above, the recommendations of the
Brundtland Report informed the action of the UN General Assembly in planning further
attention to the problems of the global environment.
The Brundtland Commission report and the Villach conclusions came together in another
venue as well. The Canadian Atmospheric Environment Service (AES) and the Canadian
Government had an interest in establishing a leadership position for Canada on global
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environmental issues. The AES used the public hearings of Brundtland to offer to host a
major international conference on the global atmosphere. Canada’s Minister of the
Environment, Tom McMillan, offered to host such a conference in May 1986, in a
statement during public hearings held by the Brundtland Commission. Climate change
was proposed to be the first topic considered.
The Conference was timed to occur after the release of the WCED Report “Our Common
Future”, which issued a call for gatherings of its kind. Gro Harlem Brundtland was
invited to give the keynote address. By February of 1987, the planning group had
determined that the results of the Villach / Bellagio meetings later in 1987 would feed
into their conference. The Canadian Atmospheric Environment Service had a direct
connection to the Villach process through Jim Bruce, the chair of the Villach 1985
meeting. Bruce and Howard Ferguson, Conference Director for the Toronto Conference
and Assistant Deputy Minister of the Atmospheric Environment Service, both attended
the Bellagio meeting.
Scientists’ Agenda and Initiatives
Prior to a discussion of the development of the Toronto Conference, the 1987 Villach /
Bellagio conferences merit attention. The above international initiatives were more or
less disconnected from direct advocacy on the part of Villach 1985 scientists. They had
largely to do with the nature of its sponsors, the international composition of the
gathering, and the strident nature of its conclusions. The 1987 Villach / Bellagio
meetings, however, were a pathway of conclusion diffusion that was orchestrated directly
by the scientists. The first meeting of the AGGG provided an opportunity for the activist
scientists to begin an initiative to pursue further links to policy.
At the first meeting of the AGGG, discussions at that meeting led one member of the
AGGG, Professor Gordon Goodman, of the Beijer Institute, proposed to organize a set of
workshops designed to address questions of policy response to climate change. (Jaeger,
1990). He was joined by two other scientists concerned with climate, Michael
Oppenheimer of the Environmental Defense Fund, and George Woodwell of the Woods
Hole Research Center. These workshops were intended to further the process of policy
development begun in 1985. They were joined in workshop planning by a steering
committee which included Bert Bolin (Sweden, International Meteorological Institute),
William Clark (USA, Harvard University), W. Degefu (Ethiopia, National
Meteorological Services Agency), Howard Ferguson (Canada, Atmospheric Environment
Service), F.K. Hare (Canada, University of Toronto), Jill Jaeger (West Germany and the
Stockholm Environment Institute), and C.C. Wallen (Kenya, United Nations
Environment Programme).
The workshops were conducted under the auspices of the AGGG and the results fed into
further AGGG efforts, particularly a report issued in 1990. The first workshop was held
from 28 September to 2 October 1987, again in Villach, Austria. This meeting explored
the implications of increases in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere for
various regions of the world. Papers were contributed by twenty scientists, economists,
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and policy experts. The papers were peer reviewed only after the conference, and
eventually published in Climatic Change in 1989. Fifty scientists and technical experts
from eleven countries attended the conference in Villach. A policy workshop was held in
Bellagio, Italy in November, where the steering committee members were joined by
fourteen others, including representatives from UNEP, the meteorological services of
New Zealand, environment bureaus of the United States, the Netherlands, the European
Union , the cabinet offices of Sweden and Germany, a member of the Commonwealth
Secretariat in England, and several NGOs. This conference emphasized that the scientific
consensus reached at the Villach 1985 conference, and the conclusions reached at the
Villach meeting were used as a starting pint for both of the 1987 workshops. The basic
conclusions of the workshop differed very little from those of Villach 1985.
According to Michael Oppenheimer, one of the organizers of the 1987 meetings, “[t]he
sponsors of the Villach and Bellagio workshops in 1987 hoped to provide a bridge
between the 1985 Villach conference, which found that the issue of climatic change
merited the attention of policy makers, and the actual elaboration of specific measures to
limit or adapt to warming” (Oppenheimer, 1989). A document based on the discussion
was edited by Jill Jaeger. The group advocated the “use of long-term environmental
targets, such as the rate of temperature change or sea-level change, would be extremely
advantageous as a management tool”(World Climate Programme, 1988, p. 21). Such
targets, they suggest, “would be based on historic rates of change of temperature or sea
level, and on expected consequences for ecosystems and society”. Given such a rate of
change, a translation into emissions targets could be made. The group identified a goal of
keeping the rate of temperature increase below 0.1 °C per decade, based primarily on the
rate of ecological adaptation, which originated with a group of scientists concerned with
the rate at which particular species of trees could migrate. Data about that ability of
countries to cope with the effects of sea level rise were used to bolster these findings. The
conference involved, for example, Pier Vellinga, a coastal engineer from the Netherlands,
who provided expertise from the Dutch experience in managing sea-level rise. The
conference included papers which gave consideration to ecological adaptation.
The temperature change scenarios adopted by the group took the reductions of CFC
production required by 2010 into account. To achieve a target of 0.2 °C per decade
(under a scenario for middle latitude locations), the group concludes that emissions of
non-CO2 gases would have to be reduced by 50 - 66%, which, they conclude, could be
achieved using current technology. To reach the 0.1 °C per decade target, the rate of CO2
emissions could have to be reduced by up to 66%. The group suggested that there were
five possible ways to achieve such CO2 reductions. Three of these options focused on the
reduction of fossil fuel use through a variety of methods (energy efficiency, alternative
energy, switch to low CO2 emitting fuels), while the other two relate to a reversal of the
current deforestation trend and the disposal of CO2 in the deep ocean. However, the goal
of 0.1 °C per decade could only be achieved “with significant reductions in fossil fuel
use” (World Climate Programme, 1988, p. 24, emphasis in original). This channel of
development of policy was notable for the absence of a considerable focus on non-CO2
gases. They were nearly dismissed as easy to handle and the report returned to a focus on
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CO2 and energy policy. However, the work of this group was notable for its focus on
targets and timetables. Several participants noted that this shift in focus was calculated to
provide not only relevant policy information, but to derive yardsticks for government
action. It represented an attempt to transform scientific facts into political factsvii.  The
group at Villach / Bellagio sought to answer the question: what can be tolerated by
ecosystems and society?
This group reflected carefully on the uncertainties that faced both climate scientists and
policy makers in evaluating the effects of greenhouse gases and climatic changes.
However, they, like Steve Schneider, judged that “[i]f decision-makers were to wait until
the scientific uncertainty is ‘acceptably’ small, most policy responses would be too late”
(Schneider, 1988, p. 32). They conclude that “a coordinated international response seems
inevitable and rapid movement towards it is urged” (World Climate Programme, 1988, p.
37, emphasis in the original). The group advocated the prompt approval and ratification
of the ozone protocol, examination of national energy policies, consideration of the issue
of deforestation, evaluation of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and limitation of the growth of
their concentrations in the atmosphere, careful consideration of policies to manage sea-
level rise, and continued scientific research. The group concluded that the report should
be used by the AGGG to further scientific and policy research, and to inform the
discussion about the development of an international agreement on climate change. The
report was presented to the AGGG in late 1987, and the AGGG formed three working
groups.
Michael Oppenheimer noted that the group that contributed to the 1987 conferences felt
that “their effort have born unusual fruit, and not fallen into the ‘black hole’ that often
swallows workshop outcomes”, for the reason that the Bellagio Report “provided a basis
for the recommendations of the June 1988 Toronto meeting, ‘The Changing
Atmosphere’” (Oppenheimer, 1989, p. 3). Given the claim that the major success of this
group’s work was the fact that it informed the Toronto Conference, the way in which the
conclusions which pushed in the direction of targets and timetables informed the Toronto
process merits attention.
The Toronto Conference: A climate agenda for national
delegates, the media, and the public
The Toronto Conference, convened in June 1987, brought together 341 delegates,
including 20 politicians and ambassadors, 118 policy and legal advisors and senior
government officials; 73 physical scientists, 50 industry representatives and energy
specialists; 30 social scientists and 50 environmental activists. Attendees came from 46
countries, both developed and developing. Fifteen agencies of 24 international
organizations were represented. The opening of the conference featured government
officials and scientists; participants were divided into thematic working groupsviii to
fashion contributions to the conclusions and recommendations of the conference. The
conclusions of the Villach process informed the conference through a background paper,
written by Jill Jaeger, who edited accounts of both the 1985 Villach and 1987 Villach /
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Bellagio conferences. It was intended to provide a common point of departure for
conference participants. The conference organizers brought working group chairs to
Toronto in advance in order to do briefing sessions based upon this background
document. The document reiterated many, if not most, of the arguments put forward by
the Villach groups concerning the seriousness of the climate problem and the urgency of
action. Recommendations for policy action echoed the Villach / Bellagio 1987
conclusions. The background paper advocated the development of a law of the
atmosphere, which could “incorporate and build on other conventions and protocols such
as the 1987 Montreal Protocol” (WMO, 1989, p. 401).
When the Villach group was tapped for a contribution to the Toronto Conference in early
1987, neither that group nor the Toronto Conference planners could have foreseen the
high profile that the Toronto Conference would enjoy in June 1988. By 1988, the climate
change issue had moved from scientific circles and specialized agencies of the United
Nations to the UN General Assembly, and to the government and legislative offices of a
number of countries. What happened in the summer of 1988 was an identifiable leap to
the public arena, the highest levels of national governments, and the international agenda
beyond the United Nations. In an editorial reflecting on what transpired during the
summer of 1988, Stephen Schneider noted that “it was with some pleasure that I observed
this viewpoint [that climatic changes could be significant in the middle of the next
century] passing from the ivy-covered halls of academe and the concrete and glass of
government offices into the popular consciousness” (Schneider, 1988).
By the time the Toronto Conference was convened in June of 1988, a serious heat wave
had occurred in the United States, and the media, accustomed to using “weather hooks”ix
to write about climate change, had provided extensive coverage of the extreme weather
and to its connections to climate change. The story is a familiar one. It links these
extreme weather events, testimony by James Hansen of NASA before the Senate to
tremendous media and public attention to the issue of climate change. The June heat
wave was just the beginning. The summer to be one of the hottest on record, and droughts
would occur in many places in the United States. However, the June heat wave was
enough to bring considerable attention to the Toronto Conference. Notes Steve
Schneider, “[a]n international gathering in Toronto at the end of June attracted so many
reporters that extra press rooms had to be added to handle the hordes of descending
journalists” (Schneider, 1989, p. 194). International media attention to the problem of
climate change began a steep rise in 1987-1988, peaking in 1990 (see data in the Social
Learning Group, 1998).
Ultimately, rather than driving the discussion about the science of climate change, many
climate scientists were being driven by it. Lamented Steve Schneider in a 1989 editorial
reflection on the summer of 1988:
By July 1988, there were cover stories in news weeklies, lead articles on
broadcast news programs, and hundreds of newspaper and magazine write-ups
appearing on the presumed connection between the heat wave and the greenhouse
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effect. With a few exceptions, there was very little scientific content in most of
the stories...” (Schneider, 1989).
Schneider, and other climate scientists, were faced with the need to make responsible
statements about the science of climate change, while also lauding the development of
public interest in the potentially harmful effects of future climatic change. The outcome
of the Toronto Conference represented intersection of these concerns.
The Toronto Conference was a critical moment in the development of an international
political agenda on climate change. The international work of scientists met a growing
public demand for information. The effect of this nexus was to make it difficult for
national leaders to avoid the issue. The Villach 1985 group and several other international
bodies brought a high degree of concern for the problem, Villach / Bellagio group
brought its new focus on targets and timetables to the conference, the outcome of the
conference was closely watched by an international media and the public. The outcome
was used by non-governmental organizations, and leader countries on climate change to
press the issue onto the political agenda.
The conclusions of the Toronto Conference are quite well known: “The Conference urges
immediate action...to counter the ongoing degradation of the atmosphere...An Action
Plan for the Protection of the Atmosphere needs to be developed, which includes an
international framework convention, encourages other standard-setting agreements and
national legislation to provide for the protection of the global atmosphere” (WMO, 1989,
p. 296). The mostly widely cited conclusion of the conference was the need to “reduce
CO2 emissions by approximately 20% of 1988 levels by the year 2005 as an initial global
goal” (p. 296). The 20% figure is still used as a benchmark by environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and some nations.
The contribution of science to this outcome and target was minimal. While the
background paper provided by the Villach / Bellagio group contained an ample summary
of the state of scientific knowledge, as well as scientific assessments of the necessary
target for CO2 emissions to achieve a “tolerable” rate of climate change over each decade,
the conclusions of Toronto did not bear any resemblance to these conclusions. Recall that
the Villach / Bellagio group suggested that a 0.1 °C per decade temperature change
would necessitate not only a 20 - 50% reduction in non-CO2 greenhouse gases, but also a
66% reduction in CO2 emissions. The Toronto target fell far short of this level. However,
the idea presented by Villach / Bellagio that targets and timetables were a way to push the
policy debate forward was diffused.
Representatives of the scientific, policy, and NGO community identify the 20% target as
the significant accomplishment of the Toronto Conference (Bruce, 1997; Boyle, 1997;
Usher, 1997; Vellinga, 1997). The Villach / Bellagio group went began a discussion of
target and timetables from a scientific perspective. At Toronto, political considerations
contributed. Accounts of the origins of the 20% target disagree in some respects. Some
suggest that the target was an NGO initiative which was successfully imposed upon a
conference that had been effectively hijacked by NGOs (Boyle, 1997; Moomaw, 1992).
Some suggest that NGOs put pressure on the working groups to adopt the
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recommendation. Others, however, suggest that the target was a conclusion of the energy
working group, led by some advocates of renewable energy. The group was led by Jose
Goldemburg, an advocate of energy efficiency and renewable energy, and included W.
Haefele, an advocate of alternative energy (nuclear).  Together, Goldemburg and Haefele,
together with the rest of the group, calculated that a 10% reduction in emissions could be
achieved through improvements in energy efficiency, and that a 10% reduction could be
achieved by transforming the source of supply of energy to renewable sources that
“deliver energy without carbon dioxide” (WMO, 1989, p. 320). Others have suggested
that the 20% figure was simply one which seemed to be a compromise between the 60%
figure that the scientific assessment had presented, but which was politically impossible,
and the desire on the part of some nations to do nearly nothing.
The actual source of the figure was probably some combination of energy committee
suggestions and the initiatives of NGOs. However, it should be noted that the
mobilization of NGOs was in the early stages at this point in the development of the
climate issue. A few NGO representatives, including the scientific Beijer Institute, had
participated in the Villach assessment process. However, they were largely acting as
scientists, rather than as representatives of their organizations (e.g. Michael
Oppenheimer, Irving Mintzer). It was these same individuals who were active in 1988. In
general, organizations had not made climate change an organizational priority. However,
many who participated in the Toronto meetings noted the presence of the NGOs and
remarked on their ability to use the media to express their views.
However, Toronto served to bring the climate change issue to the attention of NGOs as
organizations, and to the forefront of organization agendas. Climate change was a
difficult issue for NGOs, as they ran campaigns around very simple themes: pollution,
energy, etc. Climate change did not fit neatly into any of these categories, and further, the
emphasis on alternative energy put the climate change issue into conflict with the anti-
nuclear campaigns of several of the major NGOs. It took some time for the NGOs to find
a place for climate change on their agendas, and to reconcile support of CO2 emission
reductions with their anti-nuclear campaigns. However, several representatives of NGOs
attended the conference, and seized the opportunity to organize themselves. The idea for
the Climate Action Network grew out of discussions between NGO representatives at the
conference, and as climate change moved onto the political agenda, NGOs organized
themselves to address it.
The 20% target was a compelling target, and subsequent declarations and conferences
have emphasized it. The Toronto Conferences was essential to the generation of
momentum towards a response to the problem of climate change. From Toronto, climate
change was a feature of a large number of international conferences (Noordwijk, the
Hague, the Group of Seven Economic Summit), and environment issues in general
enjoyed a high profile.
30
Conclusion
The Toronto Conference does not mark the end of the climate story. Despite calls for
action to respond to the threat of climate change, the negotiation of a convention was not
initiated until 1990, and the signatories to the resulting Framework Convention on
Climate Change have yet to make substantial commitments to reductions in greenhouse
gases.
However, by 1988 - 1989, climate change was undoubtedly an issue that received
considerable attention from the nations of the world. Agreement about the need for action
on climate change was so significant that the declaration of a representative of the Soviet
Union at a 1988 conference that some countries could benefit from climate change was
received like “swearing in the church” (McGourty, 1988, p. 194). This high level of
international attention came as a surprise to many of those involved with the climate
change issue. From his perch in 1987, Willliam Kellogg lamented that despite
considerable increases in scientific knowledge and the emergence of a scientific
consensus that increases in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are warming the earth and
that humans are to blame, “we have yet to see an important governmental or industrial
decision that actually acknowledged the climate change factor.” Nor have measures been
taken to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change. Kellogg concludes that “there are
a number of reasons for thinking that the nations of the world would not unite to prevent
the impending climate change” (Kellogg, 1987, p. 25).
Kellogg was not the only observer who thought that the likelihood of international
cooperation to prevent climate change. Tom Schelling, an astute observer of global
strategy, noted in 1983 that
In the current state of affairs the likelihood is negligible that the three great
possessors of the world’s known coal reserves -- the Soviet Union, the People’s
Republic of China, and the United States of America -- will consort on an
equitable and durable program for restricting the use of fossil fuels through the
coming century and successfully negotiate it with the world’s producers of
petroleum and with the fuel-importing countries, developed and developing
(NRC, 1983, p. 481).
However, within several months of the publication of Kellogg’s article, new development
suggested that serious efforts would be made to reach international agreements on
measures to protect the climate. Scientific concern had translated into myriad
international declarations and movement toward policy action.
This paper represents one approach to understanding the links between science and
policy, and to understanding why observers like Kellogg and Schelling found climate
change on the international agenda by the end of the 1980s.  This study detailed the
conclusions of the Villach 1985 conference and analyzed the pathways and form of the
diffusion of those conclusions into the international policy making community. The
period from 1983-1988 was relatively rich in attention to environmental issues. Many
initiatives were occurring on a number of agendas (science, legislative, national, UN).
31
The story is complex, and many factors were pushing in the direction of attention to a
number of environmental issues. However, this paper makes the case that the assessments
conducted in during this time by UNEP, WMO and ICSU made political judgments about
scientific facts which resonated with other initiatives on the environment. Several
scientists pursued the issue in a variety of venues, and helped to shape the language that
was used to talk about climate change and to motivate the development of an
international agenda on climate change.  The conclusions of the Villach conference
helped to draw the attention of the nations and individuals who continue to pursue
negotiated solutions to the climate change problem today.
32
References
Abrahamson, D. E. 1989. “Global warming: the issue, impacts, responses.” In The
Challenge of Global Warming. Washington DC:  Island Press.
Bares, J.C., Jaeger, J, and Ell, R. 1998. “From Laggard to Leader: Global
Environmental Risk Management in Germany” In The Social Learning Group,
Clark, W.C., J. Jaeger and J. van Eijndhoven, eds, Learning to Manage Global
Environmental Risks:  A Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate
Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain.  Cambridge:  MIT Press.
Baumgartner, F. R. and B. D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American
Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Benedick, R. E.  1991. Ozone Diplomacy:  New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet.
Cambridge:  Harvard University Press.
Bernauer, T.  1996.  “Protecting the Rhine River against Chlorine Pollution.” In
Keohane, R. O. and M. Levy, eds. Institutions for Financial Aid:  Pitfalls and
Promise.  Cambridge:  MIT Press.
Bodansky, D. 1993. “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
A Commentary.” The Yale Journal of International Law 18(2): 451-558.
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. 1994a. “Global Climate Protection Policy: The Limits of
Scientific Advice / Part 1.” Global Environmental Change 4(2): 140-159.
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. 1994b. “Global Climate Protection Policy: The Limits Of
Scientific Advice / Part 2.” Global Environmental Change 4(3): 185-200.
Bolin, Bert. “Science and Policy Making” Ambio 23 (1): 25-29.
Boyle, S. 1997. Interview with W.E. Franz. London, England, March 1997.
Bruce, J. P. 1997. Interview with W.E. Franz and S. Agrawala. Telephone, April 1997.
Clark, W.C.  1997.  Interview with W.E. Franz.  Vienna, Austria.  January 1997.
Clark, W.C. and N. Dickson.  1998.  “Civic Science:  America’s Encounter with Global
Environmental Risk.” In The Social Learning Group, Clark, W.C., J. Jaeger and J.
van Eijndhoven, eds, Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks:  A
Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion,
and Acid Rain.  Cambridge:  MIT Press.  Draft copy, version 1, April 10, 1996.
Connolly, B. and M. List.  1996.  “Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union.”  In Keohane, R. O. and M. Levy, eds. Institutions for Financial
Aid:  Pitfalls and Promise.  Cambridge:  MIT Press.
Cooper, R.N.  1989.  Can Nations Agree?  Issues in International Economic
Cooperation.  Washington D.C.:  Brookings Institution.
Goldemberg, J. 1994. “Science And The Climate Convention.” Science and Global
Security 4: 407-424.
Hecht, A. D. and B. R. Doos. 1988. “Climate Change, Economic Growth And Energy
Policy: A Recommended U.S. Strategy For The Coming Decades / An Editorial.”
Climatic Change 13(1): 1-3.
33
Hecht, A. D. and D. Tirpak. 1995. “Framework Agreement On Climate Change: A
Scientific And Policy History.” Climatic Change 29: 371-402.
Haas, P.M. 1990.  Saving the Mediterranean.  New York:  Columbia University Press.
Haas, P.M., R.O. Keohane, M. Levy.  1993. Institutions for the Earth:   Sources of
Effective International Environmental Protection.  Cambridge:  MIT Press.
Henderson-Sellers, A. 1990. “Greenhouse Guessing: When Should Scientists Speak
Out? / An Editorial.” Climatic Change 16(1): 5-8.
Jaeger, J., ed.  1990.  Responding to Climate Change:  Tools for Policy Development.
Stockholm Environment Institute.
Jaeger, J. and T. O'Riordan. 1996. “The History Of Climate Change Science And
Politics”. In Jaeger, J. and T. O’Riordan, eds.  Politics Of Climate Change: A
European Perspective. London: Routledge.
Jaeger, J. 1997. Interview with W. E. Franz.. Vienna, Austria, February 1997.
Kellogg, W. W. 1987. “Mankind's Impact On Climate: The Evolution Of An
Awareness.” Climatic Change 10(2): 113-136.
Kingdon, J. W. 1995.  Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.  Second Edition.
New York:  Harper Collins College Publishers.
Krasner, S.  1983.  International Regimes.  Ithaca:  Cornell University Press.
Levy, M. A. 1993.  “European Acid Rain:  The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy.”  In
Haas, P.M., R.O. Keohane, and M. Levy, eds.  Institutions for the Earth:   Sources
of Effective International Environmental Protection.  Cambridge:  MIT Press
Litfin, K.  1994.  Ozone Discourses:  Science and Politics in Global Environmental
Cooperation.  New York:  Columbia University Press.
McGourty, Christine.  “Global Warming Becomes an International Political Issue.”
Nature 336 (6196): 194.
Meyer-Abich, K. 1980. “Chalk On The White Wall? On The Transformation Of
Climatological Facts Into Political Facts.” In Ausubel, J. and A.K. Biswas, eds.
Climatic Constraints And Human Activities. Oxford: Peragamon Press.
Moomaw, W.  1992.  Interview with N. Dickson.  March 1992.
National Research Council.  1983.  Changing Climate.  Washington D.C.:  National
Academy Press.
Oppenheimer, M. 1989. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Environmental Consequences
And Policy Responses.” Climatic Change 15(1/2): 1-4.
Parson, E. A. 1993. “Protecting the Ozone Layer.”  In Institutions for the Earth:
Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection.  Cambridge:  MIT
Press.
Pomerance, R. 1989. “The Dangers From Climate Change: A Public Awakening.” in
Abrahamson, D.E., ed. The Challenge Of Global Warming. Washington DC,
Island Press: 259 - 269.
Schneider, S. 1988. “The Greenhouse Effect And The U.S. Summer Of 1988: Cause
And Effect Or A Media Event? / An Editorial.” Climatic Change 13: 113-115.
34
Schneider, S.  1989.  Global Warming:  Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century?  San
Francisco:  Sierra Club Books.
SCOPE. 1986. The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change, And Ecosystems SCOPE 29.
Bolin, B., B. R. Doos, et al., eds. Chichester:  John Wiley & Sons.
The Social Learning Group. 1998. Clark, W.C., J. Jaeger and J. van Eijndhoven, eds,
Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks:  A Comparative History of
Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain.
Cambridge:  MIT Press
UNEP and Beijer Institute.  1989.  The Full Range of Responses to Anticipated Climatic
Change.
Usher, P. 1997. Interview with W.E. Franz, Bonn, Germany, March 1997.
Vellinga, P. 1997. Interview with W.E. Franz. Telephone, February 1997.
von Moltke, K. 1989. “International Agreement To Stabilize Climate: Lessons From
The Montreal Protocol / An Editorial.” Climatic Change 14(3): 211-212.
Wildavsky, A. 1995. But Is It True? A Citizen’s Guide To Environmental Health And
Safety Issues. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Willetts, P., ed. 1996. The Conscience Of The World: The Influence Of Non-
Governmental Organizations. London: Hurst & Company.
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).  1987.  Our Common
Future.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press.
WMO. 1986. Report Of The International Conference On The Assessment Of The Role
Of Carbon Dioxide And Of Other Greenhouse Gases In Climate Variations And
Associated Impacts. Villach, Austria, 1985, WMO/UNEP/ICSU.
WMO. 1979. The World Climate Conference: A Conference of Experts on Climate and
Mankind, Geneva, Switzerland, February 1979.  Secretariat of the WMO.
World Climate Programme.  1984.  Report of the Study Conference on Sensitivity of
Ecosystems and Society to Climate Change, Villach, Austria, September 1983.
WMO/UNEP/ICSU.
World Climate Programme. 1988.  Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic
Change.  A summary of the discussions and recommendations of the workshops
held in Villach, Austria, September - October 1987, and Bellagio, November
1987.  WMO, UNEP, Beijer Institute.
35
Endnotes
                                                
i
 For comments on an earlier draft of this paper the author thanks William C. Clark, Jill Jaeger, Robert O.
Keohane, Edward Parson and Stephen Schneider.  This paper has benefited from discussions with
participants in the Global Environmental Assessment project, as well as participants in climate
assessments and climate politics.  The author would like to thank James Bruce, Stewart Boyle, Bill Clark,
Jill Jaeger, John Lanchbery, Peter Usher, and Pier Vellinga for sharing their insights and experiences.
Shardul Agrawala and Clark Miller engaged in many useful discussions with the author, and Nancy
Dickson generously shared her research materials on climate change.  The International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna was an ideal place to study and work; Jill Jaeger and Ingrid
Teply-Baubinder, together with the IIASA librarians, were superb hosts.  The Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs likewise provided a terrific work environment.  The author acknowledges
support from the Global Environmental Assessment project and the Institute for the Study of World
Politics.  Any shortcomings in the rendering of events are the responsibility of the author.
ii
 Acknowledgments to John Holdren for articulating this definition so well during a group conference
call.
iii
 It should be noted that some theorists have pointed out that scientific consensus is not as useful a
predictor of international cooperation (or the absence of political bargaining) as the observations above
may suggest (see for example, Parson 1993; Litfin, 1994). However, the argument about scientific
consensus is pursued here because many observers have suggested the Villach conclusions were
significant because they represented scientific consensus. The goal here is to determine the extent of the
strength of the claim in this case.
iv
 The largest opposition to conference statements came from U.S. Department of Energy participants,
who wanted the statement to be watered down. The scientific uncertainties, they argued, were still too
great. Conference observers that were interviewed disagreed about the extent to which these officials
verbally disagreed while at Villach. However, it is clear that their dissent was critical to the dissemination
of the Villach findings, which will be discussed later.
v
 I am grateful to Clark Miller for bringing Malone’s participation in the 1983 study and congressional
testimony to my attention.
vi
 This conclusion is based on a list of contributors to hearings, communications, reports for the
Commission, (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 366- 387). None of the
following people or organizations appear: Villach: the Chair (Jim Bruce) or Co-Chairs (G.S. Golitsyn, R.
Herrera, J. Rasmussun); Primary editors of the SCOPE 29 report (B. Bolin, B. Doos, R. Warrick, J.
Jaeger); The Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases or its members; Michael Oppenheimer and George
Woodwell.
vii
 Klaus Meyer-Abich (1980) elaborates on the idea of scientific and political facts.
viii
 Energy, food security, urbanization and settlement, water resources, land resources, coastal and marine
resources, forecasting and futures, decision-making and uncertainty, industry trade and investment,
geopolitical issues, legal dimensions, integrated programs
ix
 Steve Schneider makes the observation that media stories about climate change often used ‘weather
pegs’ to set up an article about longer term trends (Schneider, 1989, p. 192)
